Abstract. We present some new ideas on attacking stream ciphers based on regularly clocked shift registers. The nonlinear lter functions used in such systems may leak information if they interact with shifted copies of themselves, and this gives us a systematic way to search for correlations between a keystream and the underlying shift register sequence.
Introduction
A n umber of cipher systems use a nonlinear lter generator to expand a short key into a long keystream. This generator is based on a linear feedback shift register, some of whose state bits are ltered through a nonlinear function to provide the keystream gure 1:
Linear feedback shift register h K i Figure 1 -the nonlinear lter generator Typical systems have shift registers of between 61 and 127 bits in length, and nonlinear lter functions of varying complexity MFB KBS CSh . Some variants use several functions simultaneously to generate a numb e r o f k eystream bits in parallel M1 .
The conventional attack o n t h e lter generator S2 S3 MS1 proceeds in two stages. Firstly, w e nd a function of the keystream which is correlated with the underlying shift register sequence; it can be shown that such a function always exists XM , even if the combining function possesses memory G . The keystream is viewed as a noisy version of the shift register sequence, and is reconstructed by v arious techniques gure 2: This`standard model', which has been the focus of most of the published work on the subject, was rst proposed by Siegenthaler S4 . His original attack involved an exhaustive search through all phases of the shift register to nd the highest correlation S3 ; Meier and Sta elbach later showed that iterative reconstruction techniques were much faster, and especially so if the shift register's connection polynomial fx i s o f l o w w eight MS1 , while Mihaljevi c and Goli c proved conditions under which these fast correlation attacks converge MG .
Where fx is not sparse, one can look for a decimation of the sequence whose polynomial is sparse A1 , or more generally a sparse multiple of f i.e., a low weight parity check CS . Meier and Sta elbach pointed out that low weight checks can be found by meet-in-the-middle techniques MS1 ; and if fx has degree n, this will take about n 2 2 n 2 operations. Recent w ork by v an Oorschot and Wiener has shown that it is feasible to construct special-purpose collision search hardware for n up to 128 or so VW . Thus the security of the nonlinear lter generators under consideration boils down to nding good correlations between the keystream and the underlying shift register.
However, the problem of nding an actual correlation tends to have been dismissed with an existence proof. Our principle that robust security depends on explicitness A2 made us suspicious of this, and inspired us to look for a construction. We would ideally like to have an algorithm which will nd the maximum correlation which an attacker can obtain; we can then use this together with the convergence bounds found in MG and M2 to establish whether a given design is vulnerable to a fast correlation attack. Our model is therefore This function is used as a primitive in K and appears to have been used in other designs too KBS ; it is distinguished by being as small a function as one can get which is both balanced and correlation immune of degree two.
As already noted, the standard attack on such a cipher would be to look for linear functions of the keystream and of the underlying shift register sequence which are correlated; a variant is the`best a ne approximation' attack of Ding, Xiao and Shan DXS . However, both these attacks throw a w a y a lot of information about the nonlinear structure of h, and our goal is to try and identifyand if possible use -all the information which h leaks. If K i = fS i,2 ; S i , 1 ; S i ; S i +1 ; S i +2 , the keystream bits K i,2 ; ; K i +2 all depend on S i , and if we w ant to approximate S i we need a function of the form S i = gK i,2 ; K i , 1 ; K i ; K i +1 ; K i +2 . However, the bits K i,2 ; ; K i +2 depend on the nine bits S i,4 ; ; S i +4 ; and so it is natural to look at the set of input 9-tuples from the shift register sequence which give rise to each possible 5-bit keystream output. We will call the 9 bit to 5 bit function the augmented function of h and write it as h.
When we count the outputs of h for each of the 512 possible inputs, we nd:
output inputs output inputs output inputs output inputs 0  18  8  11  16  16  24  23  1  16  9  17  17  18  25  17  2  14  10  12  18  16  26  10  3  20  11  12  19  18  27  18  4  16  12  23  20  12  28  17  5  14  13  13  21  10  29  15  6  21  14  13  22  15  30  19  7  17  15  19  23  15  31  17 We might h a v e hoped that a good system would have each output generated by sixteen inputs, but the actual table is irregular, and this may give u s a w a y in. For example, there are two outputs 21 and 26 generated by only ten inputs, and if we look at the inputs which generate 26, we nd that they are :   001010101  001110001  001110010  100110001  100110010  101001011  101110001  101110010  110110001  110110010 Casting our eye d o wn these columns, we see that there is only a single zero in the fth column, and a single one in the sixth and seventh. In other words, if K i ; :::; K i+4 = 11010, then S i+2 = 1 , S i +3 = 0 and S i+4 = 0 with probability 0.9 in each case. The other columns give us correlations of 0.7, 0.8, and so on. Now the fact that the correlation between a nonlinearly ltered sequence and the underlying shift register is uneven was rst pointed out by F orr e F , but she did not investigate the matter further. At last we h a v e explained this irregularity | it is simply a matter of counting the input output stability of the augmented function h.
Of course, we do not just get information from those inputs which give rise to the least common outputs. For example, when we consider the 17 inputs which generate the output 9, a delightful discovery awaits us: these 17 inputs are all zero in the fourth bit. So whenever we see that K i ; :::; K i+4 = 01001, we know that S i+1 = 0 . Now, one might at rst think that this yields an optimal correlation attack.
After all, if h is an m-bit to 1-bit function, then each shift register bit will contribute to precisely m keystream bits, and we might expect that all the correlation information could be found by examining the augmented function which generates these bits. If we are lucky, w e will nd correlations of one and be able to solve the cipher outright using linear algebra; otherwise, we should still get lots of correlations of the order of 0.8 or 0.9, with which a probabilistic reconstruction becomes fairly straightforward M2 .
However, we can get more than just correlations between the K i and the S i .
On looking more closely at the above table, we notice that columns 5 and 6 are inverses of each other. Thus whenever K i ; :::; K i+4 = 11010, then S i+2 = 1 + S i +3 . Similar relations are to be found in the other output sets; for example, if K i through K i+4 are all equal to zero, then S i+3 = S i+4 = S i+5 . Every such equation halves the keyspace which w e still have to search.
How well does our technique work against other nonlinear combiners? In recent y ears, a lot of attention has been paid to bent functions MS2 . We l o o k ed a t a t ypical bent function, hx 1 ; :::; x 6 = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 1 x 4 + x 2 x 5 + x 3 x 6 , and found it to be signi cantly worse than the correlation-immune function discussed above. In fact, its augmented function never attains nine possible output values 12, 15, 30, 31, 47, 60, 61, 62, 63 , while the zero output is attained 100 times. Its information leakage is heavy; for example, the output value 17 is attained 12 times, with all twelve inputs having S 1 = S 2 = 1 and S 4 = S 5 = S 11 = 0 .
The use of almost bent functions has also been suggested; these are bent functions which have been made balanced by changing a few output values. When we c hanged the above b e n t function's output from 0 to 1 for input values of 7, 11, 23, and 27, we found that the columnar behaviour was somewhat less marked, but seven of the nine missing output values were now attained by small numbers of inputs and the output 31 was only generated by the single input 00010111011. We concluded that attacking a lter generator using a bent or almost bent function would be easy.
The device reported in M1 and MFB uses as its lter what we might call a De Bruijn function | a function on k input bits whose value at the input n is the n-th bit of a 2 k bit De Bruijn sequence. This lter has the interesting property that its augmented function is balanced, with every possible output attained exactly 2 k times; it also has the property that for each output, the last k bits of each of the inputs are identical. For example, with one of the De Bruijn functions implemented in MFB , the output 21 is attained for 32 inputs of the form ******10110. In other words, the information leakage is total.
One also notices from looking at a few candidates that most randomly chosen balanced lter functions appear to leak rather badly. This suggests that just as it is a bad idea to replace the DES S-boxes with random ones BS , it is also a bad idea to use randomly chosen lters; and of course a knowledgeable designer can easily place a trapdoor in the lter.
Many further implications remain to be worked out. For example, even if h has too many inputs for exhaustive analysis, it may still have some structure which w e can use. It might h a v e a tractable mathematical de nition as in CSh ; if it has a regular tree structure which is key dependent K A3 , then these keybits might be deduced by observing which patterns are most common in decimations of the keystream; where an unknown permutation is introduced in the tree structure, the ideas of MDO may b e useful; and even where none of these tricks can be used, statistical sampling of the augmented function may still give information to the opponent.
Some systems use a number of nonlinear lters in parallel to generate more than one bit of keystream at a time M1 ; but these functions could well interact i n a w a y which facilitates an attack. In fact, in a recent NSA patent on a device for generating simultaneous keystreams, the underlying generator is run at high speed to ensure that the keystreams are linearly independent S1 .
Another implication is that when doing a correlation attack, the`lumpiness' of the correlation will mean that we h a v e little information about some bits in the shift register sequence, but will know others with high probability. Existing shift register reconstruction algorithms will no longer work, as the problem is now that that of nding S such that given m bits Z and an n by m matrix A, jAS , Zj is minimised. This problem is tackled in another paper in this volume M2 , which w as motivated in part by this work and which extends the techniques pioneered by Meier and Sta elbach.
Clearly, when designing keystream generators, we must write down all the keystream bits K i to which an arbitrary shift register bit S i contributes, and then all the equations whereby these bits in turn are generated. We should then consider all the occurrences of S i in these equations and check for information leakage. On considering a few examples, it appears that using either multiple shift registers or multiple lter functions makes the security harder to evaluate.
Conclusions
We have shown a practical method for searching for the best possible local correlations nonlinearly ltered shift register sequences. The key is to look at how the lter function reacts with shifted copies of itself. This article was processed using the L A T E X macro package with LLNCS style
